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Employer Immunity in Independent-Contractor
Torts in Ohio
Robert Blattner*
T HE RULE that an employer is not liable for the tortious acts of
an independent contractor working for him seems clear and
easy to apply. But within this seemingly simple statement lies
a multitude of conflicting problems.
For example, Mr. Justice Rutledge has said of this that:
" . it is enough to point out that with reference to an identical
fact situation, results may be contrary over a very considerable
region of doubt . . . depending upon the state or jurisdiction
where the determination is made."' Moreover, the courts have
grafted a number of "exceptions" onto the "rule" stated above,
so that quite often an employer will be held liable for the torts
of his independent contractor. In fact, the courts have developed
so many exceptions to the rule that one judge commented that:
"... it would be proper to say that the rule is now primarily
important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions." 2
With the introduction of exceptions into the picture, the
problem begins to take shape.3 The independent contractor situ-
ation differs from most other tort cases in that the employer
usually is not the actual tortfeasor.4 As the contractor is the one
who commits the actual wrong, the employer is liable, if at all,
only vicariously. One of the main questions becomes not whether
the injured party shall recover, but from whom he shall recover.
This is the question examined here. 5
* Of Lima, Ohio; member of the Ohio Bar; etc.
[Editors' Note: This is a revision of a prize-winning article in the annual
Sindell Tort Prize writing competitions sponsored by the law firm of Sindell,
Sindell, Bourne, Disbro and Markus, of Cleveland.]
1 National Labor Relations Board v. Hearst Publications, 322 U. S. 111, 122(1944). Thus governmental immunity was extended to a contractor doing
government work, in Pumphrey v. J. A. Jones Construc. Co., 94 N. W. 2d 737
(Iowa 1959).
2 Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler & Mfg. Co., 201 Minn. 500, 503, 277
N. W. 226, 228 (1937).
3 For a brief history of the rule and its exceptions, see Comment, 39 Yale
L. J. 861 (1930). The independent contractor concept was virtually un-
known in English common law until Bush v. Steinman, 1 Bos. and P. 404(1799). Though repudiated by the court in Laugher v. Poenter, 5 B. & C.
547 (1826), with the case of Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers Co., 2 E. & B.
767 (1853) the growth of the many exceptions began.
4 For a qualification of this statement, see text infra, dealing with cases
concerning personal fault of the employer.
5 In this article it will be assumed that the independent contractor is the
one who has the responsibility for completing the work, with little right of
control reserved by the employer. See Firestone v. Industrial Comm'n., 144
Ohio St. 398, 59 N. E. 2d 147 (1945), for a complete discussion of the defi-
nition of an independent contract.
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Personal Fault of the Employer
An employer is not immune from liability for a contractor's
torts if it is found that the employer was personally responsible
for the injury. This means that if the employer, by his own neg-
ligent action "caused" the damage, he will be liable, although
he hired an independent contractor to do the work.
True, the employer's liability is not precisely "vicarious" in
these instances, since the cause of action is based on his own
negligence rather than that of the contractor. Still, as Mechem
points out, the courts talk of these cases as though they were
examples of vicarious liability. Thus it is necessary to include
them in a discussion of the problem.6
Generally, if an incompetent contractor is chosen by the em-
ployer7 , or if the work to be done is considered illegal," or if a
dangerous instrumentality is furnished to the contractor,9 the
Ohio courts have stated that the employer must bear the loss.
The basis of the decisions appears to be that if it is foreseeable
that the work may be injurious to third persons the employer
has a personal duty to prevent harm to them.10 This sometimes is
called "nondelegable duty." (See below.)
In the landmark case of Covington and Cincinnati Bridge
Company v. Steinbock and Patrick, the question whether to re-
lieve the employer from personal liability was squarely met.1 '
There the defendant-landowner hired an independent contractor
to tear down a wall for him. In the course of demolition the
plaintiff's property was damaged. The court ruled that when
danger to others is likely to accompany the doing of certain work
unless extreme caution is taken, the employer has the duty to
see that the job is done with approximate care. The landowner
was deemed to be at fault in spite of a provision in the contract
stating that he was not to be liable for injuries sustained as a
result of the work.
In a modern counterpart of this case, the Ohio Supreme
Court has reached a similar result. Although the court pri-
marily dealt with the problem of indemnity between the con-
tractor and his employer, in Globe Indemnity Company v.
Schmitt, the court asserted that an occupier of premises, who
maintains a covered opening in the sidewalk for his benefit, is
answerable for injuries sustained by a plaintiff who falls into
6 Mechem, Outlines of the Law of Agency, § 482 (4th ed., 1952).
7 Norris v. Citizens Publishing Co., 13 Ohio L. Abs. 177 (Ohio App. 1932),
where the court indicated that if incompetency was shown, the employer
would be liable.
8 Clark v. Fry, 8 Ohio St. 358, 72 Am. Dec. 590 (1858).
9 Jacobs v. Fuller & Hutsinpiller Co., 67 Ohio St. 70, 65 N. E. 617 (1902).
10 See also Railroad Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio St. 207, 24 N. E. 269 (1890), where
the court dealt with the case as though the defendant railroad was the
one that actually injured the plaintiff, although a contractor was the actual
cause of the plaintiff's injury.




the opening because of negligence on the part of an independent
contractor. 12 The contractor had removed the cover in order to
collect waste materials, and had failed to guard it while sweeping
up.
If the plaintiff is aware of the potential danger he may en-
counter from work being done, he may have assumed the risk
of possible injury.' 3 This gives the employer a valid defense to
any action brought for harm caused by the contractor's neg-
ligence. Or, where the plaintiff's damage is not the direct or
natural consequence of the business being performed, the em-
ployer may be free of responsibility. As the court remarks in
Clark v. Fry: "[I]f the thing which they [the employer-defend-
ant] ordered to be done might have been done in a perfectly in-
nocent and proper manner, they are not liable." 14
Thus, while the employer's liability 15 often is a question of
fact for the jury, it seems that the eventual outcome in the "per-
sonal fault" cases depends on how far the courts are willing to
extend the duty of the employer. If it is foreseeable that harm
will result from the risk he has created, the employer will be
found "at fault" and directly responsible for the injuries which
follow the performance of the work-apart from the fact that
he delegated part of the job to an independent contractor. On
the other hand, if it is found that the injury arises from the un-
foreseeable negligent act of the contractor alone, there usually
will be no duty imposed on the employer. The court will call the
negligence "collateral" to the work the employer ordered, and
the independent contractor will be held liable because he alone
created the danger.
Inherently Dangerous Work Created by the Employer
It is generally accepted that if an employer hires an in-
dependent contractor to do work which is "inherently danger-
ous," the employer will be held accountable for injuries received
by a third person. The words "inherently dangerous" seem to
imply that the employer has a duty to use due care to see that
no one is hurt if the work itself is dangerous, 16 or if the instru-
mentality used is so dangerous that unless proper precautions
are taken an injury probably will result. 17
There are nineteenth-century Ohio cases which say that for
failure to fence-in a cistern,' 8 or to protect a ditch built across a
12 142 Ohio St. 595, 53 N. E. 2d 790 (1944).
13 Wellman v. East Ohio Gas Co., 160 Ohio St. 103, 113 N. E. 2d 629 (1953).
14 8 Ohio St. 358, 382, 72 Am. Dec. 590, 598 (1858).
15 123 Ohio St. 304, 175 N. E. 207 (1931).
16 City of Tiffin v. McCormack, 34 Ohio St. 638, 32 Am. Rep. 408 (1878).
'7 Jacobs v. Fuller & Hutsinpiller, 67 Ohio St. 70, 65 N. E. 617 (1902).
18 Circleville v. Neuding, 41 Ohio St. 465 (1885).
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1960
9 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
public road,19 or to cover a coal vault under a sidewalk,20 the
employer would be liable although the independent contractor
was the actual wrongdoer. Taken together, they emphasize that
if the job being done on the owner's property involves inter-
ference with free public passage on the streets, and if the work
is inherently dangerous, the risk of loss can not be shifted to
the independent contractor.A modern synthesis of these decisions appears in the case of
Richman Brothers v. Miller.21 Richman Brothers engaged Ohio
Edison to keep the store sign, overhanging the sidewalk, in a
clean, workable condition. Ohio Edison, in turn, employed
Walker to paint the sign. An employee of Walker's, while paint-
ing the sign, negligently dropped a paint bucket on a pedestrian
passing below. The pedestrian sued Richman's for damages, and
recovered. The court said that since the work presented a danger
to the public the responsibility should be placed upon "the per-
son who orders-the work to be done to see that reasonable pre-
cautions are taken to prevent injury." 22
The key question of the independent contractor-employer
problem is presented in the Richman case-to what lengths will
the courts go in upholding or destroying the employer's im-
munity? On the one hand, there is the fact that an employer
has hired another to do work over which the employer can exer-
cise little or no control. On the other hand, the work is being
done for his benefit. The court must balance these elements.
In Richman, the Supreme Court quoted with approval Judge
Minshall's opinion in the Covington case where he said that "the
principles of distributive justice should force the employer to
pay." 23 This seems to intimate that often the real basis for a de-
cision holding the employer accountable rests on "public policy"
grounds. Following this line of reasoning the Ohio Supreme
Court has extended the employer's liability to include, not only
dangerous work, but also dangers created because ordinarily
safe work was negligently done.2 4
But the Ohio cases are not constantly "anti-employer." When
the Maxwell Publishing Company arranged to have its building
painted, no trouble of any sort was anticipated. There an em-
ployee of the painter hired to do the job took a screen door off
its hinges to dry. He placed the door on the sidewalk. A breeze
pushed the door over onto the plaintiff who was passing by.
19 Railroad Co. v. Morey, 47 Ohio St. 207, 24 N. E. 269 (1890).
20 Hawver v. Whallen, 49 Ohio St. 69, 29 N. E. 1049 (1892).
21 131 Ohio St. 424, 3 N. E. 2d 360 (1936).
22 Richman Brothers Co. v. Miller, supra, note 21, at syllabus 2. Note that
the language of the court is similar to that in the cases dealing with the
employer's personal fault.
23 Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Steinbock & Patrick, 61 Ohio St.
215, 229, 55 N. E. 618, 621 (1899).
24 Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. Dingle-Clark Co., 142 Ohio St. 346, 52




Since there would have been no need to take special safety pre-
cautions if the work had been properly performed, the work was
held not to be inherently dangerous.2 5 The injury was said to
be proximately caused rather by the separate negligent act of
the paint-contractor's employee, and that negligence was merely
collateral to the project of painting the building.
In another case,26 the court thought that the harm did not
occur from any act which the employer hired the independent
contractor to perform. Consequently, when the plaintiff's hogs
died from eating enamel which had been left on the ground by
the contractor's workmen when they re-laid a pipeline for the
gas company, the work was not "necessarily dangerous" enough
to place the responsibility on the company. The injury was
caused by negligence outside the scope of the work contracted
for; therefore the gas company owed no duty of special care to
the plaintiff.
The diverse results in the "inherent danger" cases can be
summarized by applying a simple statement of law: the em-
ployer will be liable for risks connected with work which is a
direct result of his orders and which is in itself dangerous; he
will not be held responsible if the actions causing the injury
were within the control of the contractor and not related to the
job as contemplated by the employer; i.e., the contractor being
guilty of collateral negligence.
Cutting through these ambiguous distinctions, it is obvious
that any work, no matter how dangerous, can be safely done. It
is also clear that the contractor's acts are the ones that actually
cause the injury. But, in Ohio, ever since the holding in the
Covington case, 27 an employer has never been quite sure whether
or not he may be held liable for a job he delegates to an in-
dependent contractor. The Richman2s decision offered no ready
answer to the problem, since it is conceivable that under similar
facts a contrary result could be reached by a court today. How-
ever, the case did serve as a warning to the employer that he
had better provide protection to third persons if there is even
a remote possibility of harm occurring from work done in con-
nection with his business.
The methods of protection open to the employer include li-
ability insurance and selection of a dependable contractor. Yet
these precautions are of no avail if a court considers it just that
the employer pay for the harm done.
25 43 Ohio L. Abs. 538, 61 N. E. 2d 816 (1945).
26 Mercer v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 80 N. E. 2d 635 (1947), aff'd., 79 N. E. 2d
685 (1947).
27 Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Steinbock & Patrick, 61 Ohio St.
215, 55 N. E. 2d 618 (1899).
28 Richman Brothers Co. v. Miller, 131 Ohio St. 424, 3 N. E. 2d 360 (1936).
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Employer's Nondelegable Duties
Often a court will say that an employer is not immune from
liability because he owed a "nondelegable duty" to the injured
person. The fact that an independent contractor was hired will
not negate this duty. Consequently, when the contractor fails
to perform the work in a proper manner, even though the em-
ployer has exercised all the care that a reasonable, prudent man
in his business would use, the employer's responsibility is con-
sidered too personal to pass on to the contractor.
A frequently cited example of a nondelegable duty arises
when a statute requires a municipality, or a county, to keep a
road in safe condition. Therefore, if a traveler is injured be-
cause of a rut in the road resulting from repairs by a contractor,
the city can not claim immunity. It is liable under the state
statute.
29
Following this rationale, if streets are rendered unsafe be-
cause of excavations on abutting land, the landowner will not
be relieved of liability for ensuing injuries merely because an
independent contractor did the work.30 The owner, like the mu-
nicipality, has a nondelegable duty not to interfere with the right
to use public thoroughfares.
But this is not the entire picture of an employer's non-
delegable duties. An employer is frequently required to obtain
a license before he may undertake a particular project. In these
instances the courts have stated that if the activity will involve
a danger to others, the duty to use due care cannot be delegated
to a contractor. Such is the case in the trucking industry today,
for example.
The usual problem is posed when an independent trucker
leases his own truck to a common carrier who is authorized by
federal and state authorities to carry freight. The independent
trucker, in effect, carries the freight for the carrier without re-
ceiving permission from any regulatory body. If the trucker is
on a haul for the carrier and negligently injures another, the
question of who is responsible inevitably arises.
Assuming that the court considered the trucker to be the
carrier's independent contractor, it could easily apply traditional
agency doctrine and insulate the carrier from liability. But, as
the trucking industry has expanded, the courts have found it
desirable to impose a duty upon the carrier which may not be
shifted by delegation.
As early as 1926 an Ohio Court of Appeals held that an au-
thorized carrier owed a nondelegable duty to the public and
could not release itself from liability for negligent acts com-
29 Circleville v. Neuding, 41 Ohio St. 465 (1885), where the city's duty
arose from what is now Ohio Rev. Code § 723.01; Whitney v. Niehaus, 4
Ohio App. 208, 28 C. P. 518 (1915), where the county was said to have a
nondelegable duty based on what is now Ohio Rev. Code § 305.12.
30 Hawver v. Whalen, 49 Ohio St. 69, 29 N. E. 1049 (1892); Railroad Co. v.




mitted within the scope of its operations as a common carrier.3 1
In that case, at the time of the collision the trucker, using his
own tractor, had rented a trailer from the carrier and was carry-
ing freight for him. Although the carrier urged that the trucker
was an independent contractor on his own business, the court
ruled that public policy required that the carrier be held to have
a nondelegable duty to the public.
The same decision was reached when the carrier had no
state authorization, although the trucker-contractor who was at
fault was an authorized carrier. 32 The explanation given was
that "the general public affected by the increased hazard has a
right to expect . . ." the liability to rest with the carrier.
3 3
Public policy does not always serve as a simple answer to
the problem. In Wood v. Vona, after the independent trucker
had finished his run for the carrier and was returning home, he
negligently hit the plaintiff.34 The Ohio Supreme Court expanded
the public policy concept and ruled that, because the carrier was
required by state law to carry liability insurance,35 the policy
would be liberally construed in order to satisfy the legislative
intent to protect the general public from loss caused by the neg-
ligence of the carrier or his independent trucker. Since the re-
turn trip was as necessary as the delivery, the trucker was said
to be still working for the carrier.
Under similar facts, a federal court sitting as an Ohio court
expressed the opinion that it was absurd to make a distinction be-
tween a loaded and an empty truck.3 6 Trucking was considered
a dangerous enough activity so that a nondelegable duty of care
was imposed on the carrier.
A contradictory result was reached when an independent
trucker, operating under the carrier's permits, had delivered his
load and had turned homeward. Before starting on his way, he
stopped for a drink. On the trip back the trucker negligently
ran into the plaintiff. The authorized carrier was found not
liable for the accident, since the trucker-independent contractor
had entirely completed his job for the carrier.37 From the
moment of completion the carrier's responsibility ceased.
31 Liberty Highway Co. v. Callahan, 24 Ohio App. 374, 157 N. E. 708 (1926).
32 Duncan v. Evans, 134 Ohio St. 46, 17 N. E. 2d 913 (1938).
33 Stickel v. Erie Motor Freight, Inc., 54 Ohio App. 74, 79, 6 N. E. 2d 15,
17 (1936).
34 Wood v. Vona, 147 Ohio St. 91, 68 N. E. 2d 80 (1946).
35 Ohio Rev. Code § 4923.08. Interstate Commerce Act, Part II, 68 Stat.
526 (1954), 49 U. S. C. § 315 (Supp. 1959) also requires public liability in-
surance as a prerequisite to issuance of authority to operate as an inter-
state carrier.
36 American Transit Lines v. Smith, 246 F. 2d 86 (6th Cir. 1957).
37 Simon v. McCullough Transfer Co., 155 Ohio St. 104, 98 N. E. 2d 19(1951); cf. Thornberry v. Oyler Brothers, Inc., 164 Ohio St. 395, 131 N. E.
2d 382 (1955). In the latter case the independent trucker unloaded his
goods and before returning home made a freight haul for his personal
profit. See also Spangenberg, Agency Problems in Motor Carrier Cases, 6
Clev-Mar. L. R. 130 (1957); and below, note 39.
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The court cited with approval an earlier Ohio decision which
declared that the liability of carriers exists only through the
course of any transportation project undertaken by the carrier.38
This seems to be a desirable result. The activity for which the
carrier's franchise was required did not contemplate the truck-
er's drinking as part of the contract. 39
The problem had become more complicated in the Ohio
courts by reference in some decisions to "Rule No. 4" issued by
the Bureau of Motor Carriers of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission.40 The Rule provided that when an independent trucker
leased a truck to the common carrier, the carrier had to have
the right to direct and control the operation of the truck at all
times and be fully responsible to the public for the wrongs done
by those acting for the carrier.
The language used in the Rule was generally in line with
the principles employed to decide earlier independent contrac-
tor-employer cases. But in two recent Ohio cases the Supreme
Court interpreted Rule No. 4 as requiring a master-servant re-
lation between the trucker-lessor and the carrier-lessee.4 1 The
court applied the doctrine of respondeat superior and remarked
that "Rule No. 4 makes the driver of an independent contractor
furnishing equipment to a shipper . . . the employee or servant
of the shipper, so far as the public is concerned." 42
Applying respondeat superior as derived from Rule No. 4 to
the "return trip" situations, if the "servant" made a deviation
outside the scope of the "master's" business, the "master" would
not be held liable. But it is questionable whether an independent
trucker can automatically be considered a servant since he may
be in business for himself, with men working for him.43 Besides,
any such determination will depend largely on the facts of each
case and the inclination of the particular court.
More important, regardless of whether the trucker is called
a servant or an independent contractor, the carrier is liable to a
third person for the negligence of an employee, because of I. C. C.
Rule No. 4.44 Since the trucker uses the carrier's freight haul-
ing permits, and exhibits them on the side of his truck, the pub-
38 Behner v. Industrial Comm'n., 154 Ohio St. 433, 96 N. E. 2d 403 (1951).
39 For further comment on this problem see Sloan, Liability of Carriers for
Independent Contractors' Negligent Operation of Leased Motor Trucks, 43
Iowa L. Rev. 531, 543 (1958); and Spangenberg Article above in note 37.
40 Administrative Rule No. 4, Bureau of Motor Carriers, I. C. C. (1936) as
amended (1939), and authorized by the Interstate Commerce Act, Part II,
54 Stat. 919 (1940), 49 U. S. C. §§ 301-327 (1951).
41 Thornberry v. Oyler Brothers, Inc., 164 Ohio St. 395, 131 N. E. 2d 382
(1955); Shaver v. Shirks Motor Express Corp., 163 Ohio St. 485, 127 N. E. 2d
355 (1955).
42 Ibid.
43 Sloan, supra note 39, at 548 to 550.





lic thinks that it is dealing with the carrier, not the independent
contractor.
Conclusion
The public's concept of the employer's duty, as interpreted
by the courts, is the one idea that ties together the cases cited.
If the independent contractor's negligent acts are considered to
be within the contemplated scope of the business, the employer's
responsibility is fixed-he had a duty not to subject the plain-
tiff to an unreasonable risk of harm, failed in his duty, and must
pay the loss. But if the acts of the independent contractor are
thought to be unusual or impractical means for accomplishing
the employer's work, the employer is said to owe no duty of care
to the injured person and is immune from liability.
Of course, any concept of duty must necessarily change as
new socio-economic pressures arise. At the time of Clark v.
Fry45 in 1858, it was important for industry to expand. There-
fore, the employer had to be given greater freedom to "farm
out" parts of his work to an independent businessman.
At the time of the Richman Brothers" decision in 1936, the
commercial world had changed. Business had increased to tre-
mendous wealth and power. There now was evident an "un-
doubted conviction of our people . . . that a business must pay
the reasonable cost of its passage." 47 The principle that only the
one actually "at fault" must bear the loss was vanishing, and a
desire to assure compensation for the innocent 'victim became
important. Since the employers of America were reaping huge
profits, it was felt that they should pay for the injuries as a
necessary part of their business.
Thus "enterprise liability" evolved as a direct consequence
of the complex economic factors that the modern industrial world
had created.4s It has been suggested by Harper and James that,
by placing tort liability on the employer, accident prevention
would be emphasized by the employer, the plaintiff would be
provided with a greater assurance of being compensated, and
the accident loss would be distributed by business among the
public.49 This reasoning, along with the fact that the person
most likely to carry and afford accident insurance would be the
45 8 Ohio St. 538, 72 Am. Dec. 590 (1858).
46 131 Ohio St. 424, 3 N. E. 2d 360 (1936).
47 Smith, Scope of the Business: The Borrowed Servant Problem, 38 Mich.
L. R. 1222, 1248 (1940).
48 See Harper & James, Law of Torts § 26.5 (1956). Douglas, Vicarious Li-
ability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale L. J. 584, 594, 600 (1928) asserts
that the employer has the best chance of shifting the risk since he has a
wider public to which to pass the loss. He does state, however, that the
independent contractor can best prevent the accident since he controls the
equipment at the time of the injury.
49 Harper & James, Law of Torts 1373 (1956).
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employer-the contractor being smaller and often less reliable-
makes a solid argument for finding the employer liable.
In spite of this rationale, it must be remembered that there
is nothing automatic about the employer's liability. The inde-
pendent contractor is a practical necessity for many businesses
that could not function without one, i.e., the trucking industry.
If the contractor's torts have no reasonable relation to the busi-
ness, it is proper to insulate the employer. His business did not
create the risk. Rather the collateral negligence of the con-
tractor caused the injury and it is he who should bear the loss.
Viewing the exceptions to the employer's immunity, it is ap-
parent that no one case can be definitely placed under one specific
exception. For example, the Richman BrotherO case could fall
within all three exceptions: the nature of the work was in-
herently dangerous; Richman's had a nondelegable duty to re-
frain from interfering with the public right to safe use of the
streets; Richman's was personally liable because by ordering the
sign painted there was a possibility of injuring someone.
Therefore, even with the aid of these conclusions, there is
still no safe basis for predicting how the Ohio courts will hold
in any particular case. "Though it would seem highly desirable
for the courts to confine nonliability [of the employer] to a few
exceptional cases . . . [T]his the American courts have not yet
done." 51
This statement is representative of the situation in Ohio to-
day. Although it is undeniably true that deep inroads have been
made upon the employer's immunity, it is also true that the
traditional rule is still alive and used in Ohio decisions.
50 131 Ohio St. 424, 3 N. E. 2d 360 (1936).
51 Harper, Law of Torts, 646 (4th ed. 1940).
May, 1960
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